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Translation
Statement given to the Presidential Commission by State Minister for Defence and National Security (Now Ambassador to India) on the brutal killing of innocent and unarmed civilian inmates in Maafushi Prison in Maldives by the authority

Translation - Statement No: RC-A-296 (Dhivehi Version), Presidential Commission, President’s Office, Malé
Name in full:         Abdul Sattar Adam (Anbari)       Date of Birth/Age: 26-07-1946
Permanent Address: M. Everest                    National ID No:      A-051150
Father’s Name: Adam Hussain                     Present Address: M. Everest
Profession: Minister of State for Defence and National Security
Date: 24 November 2003

I have been working for the National Security Service (NSS) for 25 years, and have been the Deputy Chief of Army for 7 years. Here I speak of the administrative procedures within the NSS. Though I am the Minister of State of the Ministry of Defence and National Security, the ministry is run practically by the Minister. We seek guidelines from the Minister. I am the senior most in the overall administration of the national security in accordance with the directions of the Chief of Army and Police (Gayyoom). The HQ is organised into different parts. Some parts come under my responsibility as the Deputy chief of the army. Some parts are delegated to the Chief of Staff. Some parts are assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff. Incidentally, the Commissioner of Police was the Deputy Chief of Staff. The section for investigation, convicts and regional police forces in the Maldives come under the control of the Commissioner of Police. I report directly to the Chief of Army on sections I am in charge. On other sections, the Chief of Army is reported by those in charge of them. I have to be informed so that when some others inquire from me on certain things I can give them the information. Some times when the president asks me about something about which I also don’t know he has said through some officials of the president’s office that I also must know about them. Besides, the executive director of the ministry of defence and national security has also told (this) to the Brigadier Adam Zahir. However, the Chief of Army makes decisions. The sections delegated to the Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff and the public service sections of Fire and Coast Guard and to me each report directly to the Chief of Army. Each takes the responsibility for the section under him. All matters of police, detention, sending on trial is carried on by the Commissioner of Police. The detention security unit was created and put under the charge of the Commissioner of Police as the job is related to the Commissioner’s. Prior to 24 April 2003 Col. Shaukath Ibrahim who was then in charge of prison security used to report to me. But as it has been changed since this date, it has to be reported to the Commissioner of Police. As the Deputy Chief of Army, I am reported for information. The quick reaction force (QRF 2) was renamed as the detention security unit on 21 April 2003. With the name of the unit its functions were changed. In prison, the inmates are mostly those who are waiting for trial following the end of the investigation though there are some still going through the investigation. After the prison was moved to Maafushi, when the situation there has changed, it was found that ‘Quick Reaction Force’ has better be the detention security unit in Maafushi. Following the said change, the Commissioner of Police was more related to the unit; so it was placed under the charge of the Commissioner. Lt. Col Ibrahim Rasheed heads the unit under the Commissioner. Below the Lt. Col. Ibrahim Rasheed is the Maj. Ibrahim Latheef. It was so decided so that if one is away the other will be there. On 19 September 2003 at about noon Maj. Ibrahim Latheef told me (on phone) that there was disorder in the prison of Maafushi. I said if there is trouble in prison to advise them and to carry on as is the rule. I did not know about crossing the cells. What I knew was taking people out of the cell for shouting and disobedience in the cell. When Maj. Ibrahim Latheef said that Capt. Adam Mohamed was in Malé I told him that, in case of unrest, it can be solved by Capt. Adam Mohamed going to Maafushi and ask the Commissioner of Police to send him to Maafushi. When I give directions I ask to tell the Commissioner of Police to refer to the Chief of Armed Forces and carry on with his advice. So I say, because Latheef cannot speak direct to the Chief of the Forces. In my directions, I give my opinion. In spite of this, a decision must be taken after referring to the Commissioner who must seek advice in the way that he should. I am not the authority to make decisions. The chief of the armed forces is told by way of information on the matter and of saying that action taken was appropriate as well. Since Maj. Ibrahim Latheef told me for information I said so in giving my opinion. Maj. Ibrahim Latheef must seek instructions from the Commissioner of Police. Given the command and control of the NSS, the Commissioner of Police must refer to the Chief of Armed Forces direct and shall carry out what he is in charge as per the instructions he receives from the Chief of the Forces. As he carries on with such instructions, I am also one among those who must have knowledge of that. As a rule, the Commissioner of Police shall come once a week, at least, to report on those under his charge of which I must be informed. As the Commissioner could not come, he sends the others. I presume that he does not come because he is busy. They come to me once a week, not for advice on doing some thing. It is to give me information. The Deputy Chief of the Forces having to be informed, I do not believe, is that the Commissioner of Police is not in full control that he has. The command and control is to the Commissioner of Police. And since the Chief of Staff also must be aware, he shall be informed, too. On 19 September 2003 at 8:30 in the night, Maj. Ibrahim Latheef told me the situation in Maafushi prison was very bad and a serviceman’s hand was broken. I told to ask the Commissioner of Police to tell the Chief of the Forces about it. So I said because it is so in the chain of command. I told to bring the injured serviceman to Malé and arrange a launch to take him to Malé. The launch ran aground that night, which I came to know the following day. The Maj. Ibrahim Latheef called me for the permission of sending a launch to Maafushi. As I can recollect, when Maj. Ibrahim Latheef called then I asked how the serviceman was injured. In the way in which the detention security unit set up, to find who kicked the serviceman and take action against him are what that unit will do, so I did not ask Maj. Ibrahim Latheef who hit the serviceman. On 19 September 2003, Maj. Ibrahim Latheef called at 11:30 in the night and told me that a prisoner had died in Maafushi prison. When the Maj. Ibrahim Latheef told me about this, I asked him that why he did not tell me when he called me before (8:30 that night) while the situation in prison was so serious. I did not know then that he was beaten to death. I ordered at once that the Chief of the Forces be informed of it through the Commissioner of Police. However, given the nature of the incident, I tried to inform the Chief of the Forces immediately. I managed to contact the First Lt. Ziyad in attendance. I asked the First Lt. Ziyad that I had something very important to tell the president and to call me back after arranging so to be done. As I could recollect, at about 11:45 or 11:50 that night the president called me. On the president’s call, I said that a prisoner had died in Maafushi prison. Still when I told the president about that I did not know what had happened in any detail. I knew that having been informed the president did start looking into the incident. I came to know that the Lt. Mohamed Aswan had reported of torture in prison only when Lt. Col. Ibrahim Rasheed told me about it. If a person sends a letter about physical violence by soldiers, I require that also to be investigated. If a complaint is made formally to the ministry of defence of violence to anyone, I order an immediate investigation into that. Having it formally is submitting it to the ministry of defence. Lt. Mohamed Aswan’s report to the Commanding Officer is not submitting formally to the defence ministry. When the case has reached the Commanding Officer, he must seek advice on how to go about it. Since he is reporting to the Commissioner of Police, he may, as a short cut, have asked to examine the case reported to the police HQ without sending to the ministry. Some times, the disciplinary committee also has carried out investigations. I did not see a report that Lt. Mohamed Aswan had sent. So, I don’t know anything to say about it. I was told for information that such a report had been made. I am sure, therefore, I would have told to ask the Commissioner of Police and look into it. If there is violence and disobedience in prison cells, giving advice is the first thing to be done. If advice did not help, take out of the cell and keep isolated. If kept out of the cell isolated, it must be out of rain or sun. By the rule, looking after the prisoners is a job of the Department of Corrections. Though the soldiers kept the security of the C-block, the Department of Corrections must keep guard over also this place, so even in case of violence in that block it must come from the Department of Corrections. In my opinion, the soldiers must not be on guard over prison. Following the November 3, 1988 incident, when the prison was in Gaamaadhoo, the soldiers were closely involved with matters of prison but have since been excluded from prison management. There were a number of terrorists in prison at Gaamaadhoo, so it had to be a high security prison, which increased the involvement of the security forces. It was for the same reason that weapons were stored there. First, the soldiers kept security of the prison including inside the prison. But, later it was reduced to the outside only. When the prison caught fire in Gaamaadhoo the security was kept outside of the prison. After the fire, when the prison had to be moved to Maafushi, the prison security was maintained by the security forces until the prisoners were transferred. I have always made it a point that the security forces are not there to deal with the prisoners. The Department of Corrections will deal with them. Even if a prisoner has been removed from the cell there must be the Corrections personnel with him. When prisoners are taken out the Corrections men must be there so that the security forces need not come into contact with the prisoners. When the prisoners have to be handcuffed, it must be done by the Corrections Guards. The security forces have to assist the Guards in case of prisoner disobedience. This is a statement I made to the inquiry into the incident of M. Asia Hassan Evan Naseem’s death. I made in my free will.

Abdul Sattar Adam
Drawn by: Shaheen Hameed
Listened by: Abdul Sattar Moosa Didi
Aishath Mohamed Didi

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